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THE UNSETTLING OF THE WEST: HOW
INDIANS GOT THE BEST WATER RIGHTS
David H.

Getches*

INDIAN RESER VED WATER RIGHTS: THE WINTERS DOCTRINE IN ITS
SOCIAL AND LEGA L CONTEXT, 1880s-1930S. By John Shurts. Norman:

University of Oklahoma Press. 2000. Pp. xv, 333. $39.95.

A single, century-old court decision affects the water rights of
nearly everyone in the West. The Supreme Court's two-page opinion
in Winters v. United States1 sent out shock waves that reverberate to
day. By formulating the doctrine of reserved water rights, the Court
put Indian tribes first in line for water in an arid region. Priority is eve
rything where water law typically dictates that the senior water rights
holder is satisfied first, even if it means taking all the water and leav
ing none for anyone else.
In the West, water rights belong to "prior appropriators." The ear
liest users of water secure legal rights to continue using water, superior
to the rights of all who come later. So when there is not enough water
for everyone, users are served in order of their priority, with the latest
users bearing the full impact of shortages. Winters held that the Fort
Belknap Reservation in Montana had rights superior to their non
Indian neighbors who had begun using water first. The Court's ration
ale was that the very creation of the Fort Belknap Reservation out of
the much larger territory ceded by the tribe effectively "reserved" the
tribe's future right to use water. The decision threatened the water
uses of the white settlers near Fort Belknap and, as precedent, it pro
foundly threatened to disrupt the expectations of all water-using
neighbors of reservations where water might be used someday.2 In the
real world of water use, though, Fort Belknap and other reservations
still despair of the lack of water.
In his probing history, Indian Reserved Water Rights, John Shurts 3
concludes that the Winters doctrine of reserved water rights is "per* Raphael J. Moses Professor of Natural Resources Law, University of Colorado School
of Law. A.B. 1964, Occidental College; J.D. 1967, University of Southern California. - Ed.

1. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
2. Id. The reserved rights principle was extended by the Supreme Court to secure water
rights sufficient to fulfill the purpose of all lands reserved for federal purposes, as well as for
Indian reservations. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
3. Adjunct Professor, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark College,
Portland, Oregon.
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haps the most potent force at the command of western tribes in their
attempt to protect their lives, resources, and society" (p. 124). Never
theless, he finds the Supreme Court's decision that created such an as
set to be less remarkable than other historians have indicated. He uses
original historical research to document how "the litigation and its
outcome fit well within the existing legal context and into on-going ef
forts at water development in the Milk River valley" where it arose (p.
4). The book explains that the Winters decision was not more contro
versial locally because some non-Indian neighbors actually gained
from the outcome. By telling a new and fuller story, Shurts also cor
rects the illusion that prior appropriation was so entrenched at the
time of the case that lawyers and courts would not consider applying
any other rule. He points out that in some quarters of the West other
approaches to water allocation were still being debated. He also pres
ents several examples of how the doctrine was, contrary to others' ob
servations, a serious topic of government activity in the years follow
ing the decision.
In Part I, I argue that the West was sufficiently committed to the
appropriation system in 1908 that the only likely departures from it
were expedients to accomplish broad social goals. Thus, if Winters had
been simply a water law decision, I believe that its apparently anti
settler thrust would have been genuinely revolutionary. But, as I offer
in Part II, the case can be best understood as an Indian law decision.
In Indian law, there is a tradition of upholding foundational principles
that buck contemporary trends in order to protect Indian rights.
Shurts has also assembled new evidence concerning the aftermath
of Winters that he uses to set right a misimpression that Winters lay
dormant for seventy-five years after it was decided. Shurts may have
succeeded in defusing the arguments of those who say they were
caught by surprise by the government's latter-day assertions of the
doctrine. But, as I discuss in Part III, learning the history does not al
leviate my suspicions that the government acted only when it was con
sistent with the interests of non-Indians, and that it actually did little
with the mighty doctrine to advance the Indians' welfare.
The doctrine of Indian reserved water rights lies at the intersection
of two fascinating, essentially unique fields of law. The development
of each field provides a rich study of American legal history rooted in
the American West. But the evolutionary patterns of jurisprudence in
each field are radically different. Only the traditions of Indian law can
explain how the Supreme Court could so threaten to disrupt the pag
eantry of national expansion led by yeoman farmers settling hostile
lands.

Unsettling of the West
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RESERVED RIGHTS AS A WATER LAW ABERRATION

A. Water Law: A Tradition of Economic Expedience
Water law has always been a malleable instrument of economic
progress. Consider the fountainheads of the prior appropriation doc
trine. One involved miners competing for water from the same stream
on federal public land.4 California, like many new states, had adopted
a gap-filling statute that made the common law of England the rule of
decision in the absence of statute. The common law followed riparian
principles, recognizing a property right in those along a stream to use
the water in its natural course. A miner who began digging gold from
the bed of a California stream, aided by the flowing water, found that
another miner had diverted water away from the stream through a ca
nal for the benefit of himself and other miners and that this interfered
with his mining on the stream. But when the miner along the stream
invoked the riparian doctrine, the California Supreme Court rejected
his claim.
The court found that the plaintiff technically was not a riparian be
cause he was there under a mining claim rather than as a landowner.
All the land was public and therefore the miners were essentially tres
passers. Because the United States, as owner of nearly all the land,
tacitly allowed the mining, and because the custom among the miners
was to allow the first person who claimed the minerals and began
working them to have a legal right to them, an analogous principle
should apply to water. The court opined that any other rule would
work to the detriment of the large number of mines that were not ad
jacent to the stream. But prior appropriation would protect miners
who take "waters from their natural beds, and. by costly artificial
works [conduct] them for miles over mountains and ravines, to supply
the necessities of gold diggers, and without which the most important
interests of the mineral region would remain without development."5
Some years later, a bigger leap was made by the Colorado
Supreme Court in Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co.6 In the 1860s, Colo
rado had adopted territorial statutes that seemed to adopt riparian wa
ter law. One statute gave persons with possessory rights to.land along
a stream rights "to the use of the water of said stream." Another pro
hibited diversion of water "from its original channel to the detriment
of [anyone] along the line of the stream" and required that enough
water be left in the stream for the use of those along it. Settlers with
fee simple to their lands - not just a mining claim on publi.c land as in
4. See Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855).
5. Id. at 146.
6. 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
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the California case - began farming along the St. Vrain River. During
a particularly dry summer, they noticed that their water supply was in
adequate. On investigation they found that someone had put a dam
far upstream and was taking water out of the St. Vrain through a ditch,
across a low divide, and into Left Hand Creek for irrigation of lands in
another watershed.
The outraged riparians tore out this diversion, provoking the Left
Hand Ditch Company, owner of the dam, to sue them. The court then
ruled in favor of the ditch company that had dried up the stream be
cause its diversion had begun before the riparians started actually us
ing water. It disregarded the riparian statutes under which the defen
dants claimed their rights, saying that it was unbelievable that the
legislature would have intended the unsavory consequences that
would result from applying the statutes. The court said "the doctrine
of priority of right by priority of appropriation for agriculture is
evoked . . . by the imperative necessity for artificial irrigation of the
soil." By contrast, the riparian doctrine urged under the statutes
"would be an ungenerous and inequitable rule . . . [and) would prevent
the useful and profitable cultivation of productive soil."7
Now, of course the court was correct that a rule limiting water uses
to those along the stream would not reward the investment of people
who had decided to take it to lands away from the stream in violation
of the statutes. And, more broadly, there was a legitimate concern
with the potential inutility of all nonriparian lands if they could not
lawfully get water.
To be sure, riparian doctrine sounded rigid and impractical. Under
the pure version of the doctrine, every landowner "upon each bank of
a river is entitled to the land, covered with water, in front of his
bank ... [and in] virtue of this ownership he has a right to the use of
the water flowing over it in its natural current, without diminution or
obstruction."8 A right to use water "without diminution or obstruc
tion" of the source once sounded less absurd than it now does. The
rule served to mediate the rights of mill owners along streams, where
the typical problem was one mill owner damming up the river to
regulate the speed and timing of flows in order to optimize the water
power available to the mill. An alteration of flow could work to the
detriment of other mills, so the rule was that everyone could use the
river's flow for power but could not alter natural conditions.
The riparian rule was not designed for one who needed to dam up
the stream to get enough power for a big mill, and it certainly did not
work for anyone who wanted to consume water or use it away from
the stream, as that would diminish the flow. No problem. Where it was
7. Id. at 449-50.
8. Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472, 474 (C.C. D. R.I. 1827) (No. 14, 312).
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a court-made doctrine, courts could modify it. So diversions that di
minished natural flow were allowed under various theories.9 And uses
on "non-riparian" land apart from the stream, even land in other wa
tersheds, were all allowed contrary to blackletter law - so long as
they were "reasonable."10 Presumably, any such use could be enjoined
but most courts simply conditioned non-riparian uses on payment of
actual damages and enjoined only unreasonable uses.11
Courts that avidly rejected riparianism and embraced prior appro
priation usually referred to the inflexibility of the doctrine and the in
herent unsuitability of such a law to the necessities of the arid West.12
This was nonsense, because riparian law could have been adapted to
the conditions and needs of the West as well as it had been to those of
the East.
When a court applied riparian law too rigidly, states rushed to
change their statutes or constitutions. When the California Supreme
Court decided that downstream landowners had a riparian right to al
low the river flow across their land to nourish grasses that provided
feed for cattle on the land,1 3 it had the effect of prohibiting develop
ment of hydroelectric dams upstream because their impoundment of
water would significantly interfere with the natural flow. Fearing that
progress would be stopped in its tracks, the state proposed, and the
voters passed, a constitutional amendment limiting riparian rights to
the water "reasonably required" for beneficial uses and reasonably di
verted.14
Suppose the Coffin court had applied riparian law and the Coffins,
with their lands along the river, had won. If the ditch company served
farmers whose uses were more valuable, it could have continued di
verting and paid damages or bargained for an appropriate payment.
The market would have allowed adjustments. Instead, Coffin and the
prior appropriation system recognized a property right to the specific
quantity of water that had actually been diverted. In any event, the
Coffins' use would be limited to what was "reasonable."
The real problem with riparianism was neither its eastern roots nor
its inflexibility. In fact, it may have been too flexible for the West. It
required courts, agencies, or officials to weigh the contentions of every
water user who claimed a reasonable use, and these institutions were

9. See id. at 474.
10. See, e.g., Stratton v.

Mt. Hermon Boys' Sch., 103 N.E. 87 (Mass. 1913).

11. Id. at 89. Modern courts simply consider nonriparian use to be an "important" factor
in determining reasonableness. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 855 (1979).
12. See, e.g. , Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446-47, 449 ("The doctrine . . .
is evoked. . . by the imperative necessity for artificial irrigation of the soil.").
13. See Herminghaus v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 252 P. 607 (Cal. 1927).
14. See CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (formerly art. XIV,§ 3).
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lacking in the old West. The simplicity and greater certainty of prior
appropriation, by contrast, allowed the users to monitor and enforce
the law themselves - at first.
To get a water right required only a diversion for a beneficial use;
the date of the first diversion determined priority of the right. But
prior appropriation soon proved too simple and too inflexible for a
changing society. Suppose a city proposed to take water out of the
stream but did not divert it for a year because of the time needed to
build canals and reservoirs. So long as there was no diversion and wa
ter was not put to a beneficial use, other users could come to the same
stream and divert water, getting a water right that was prior in time to
the city's. To allow time to build diversion facilities, then, courts ruled
that the diversion and beneficial requirements - the essentials of the
doctrine - need not be satisfied in order to secure a priority date.15 If
there was evidence of intent to divert, and if work on the diversion
continued with reasonable diligence culminating in an actual diversion
sometime in the future, the priority date would relate back to the first
manifestation of intent. Sensible as this new rule may have been, given
the realities of water development for a growing economy, it changed
the basic nature of the doctrine. And proving the subjective require
ments of intent and due diligence demanded the involvement of
courts, agencies, and officials.
Prior appropriation by definition protects prior users from the acts
of subsequent users. But what if a prior user wanted to change the
place where water was taken from the stream and the move made it
more difficult for a junior user to use water? Courts in appropriation
states have only allowed changes in the point of diversion and changes
in the type or timing of use on the condition that they not harm other
water users, including juniors.16 This embellishment of prior appro
priation law adds another complication. Engineering evidence of the
impacts on junior users resulting from the senior user's change has to
be weighed by a court or agency.
The prior appropriation system was created to work out competing
uses among private parties with water rights. But the general public
was impacted when the first user to get to the water monopolized it for
a wasteful project or if there was no water left for future generations,
for fish, or for recreation. Consequently, most states adopted constitu
tional or statutory requirements that water rights would be recognized
only if they were consistent with the "public interest" or the "public
welfare."17 Leaving aside criticisms of the spotty effectiveness of such
15. E. g., Sand Point Water & Light Co. v. Panhandle Dev. Co., 83 P. 347 (Idaho 1905).
16. E.g., McDonald & Blackbum v.Bear River & Auburn Water & Mining Co., 13 Cal.
220, 239-40 (1859).
17. See A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 263-81 (4th ed.
1993).
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provisions, they surely introduced subjective factors that required in
stitutions like courts or agencies to exercise discretion, and they fun
damentally altered the simple, priority-based doctrine. The courts
have upheld extremely broad discretion in water officials under the
banner of public interest. So important is the public interest in water
that even where laws were silent, the California courts superimposed a
"public trust doctrine" requiring the public interest to be considered
before rights are allocated.18
Part of the mythology of the West is that the prior appropriation
doctrine is inexorably linked to the West's aridity. Shurts convincingly
rejects this myth (pp. 36-40). As its evolution shows, the essence of wa
ter law has been to change rules as necessary to fulfill the social and
economic goals of the time. Shurts joins other revisionist historians in
attributing the evolution of water law to the perceived "needs of an
emerging market capitalist society" (p. 38). This was the conclusion of
Morton Horowitz concerning riparian law in his famous The Trans
formation of American Law, 1780-1860,19 as well as of noted historians
of the prior appropriation doctrine like Donald Pisani and Donald
Worster (pp. 38-40). Whenever either doctrine, riparian or prior ap
propriation, had to be altered to fit social and economic needs, courts
or legislatures would act.
B. The Winters Doctrine: A Misfit in Contemporary Water Law?
Establishing that prior appropriation was not the only system that
conceivably could have worked in the West does not mean that any
other system was politically viable at the time of Winters. The doctrine
had become the dominant, if not exclusive, method of water allocation
in the West. This fact caused most observers to find the Supreme
Court's decision in Winters surprising. It seemed to fabricate a new
system that risked producing results contrary to well-accepted ideas of
what was progressive and desirable for social and economic welfare of
the expanding West. The Court must have understood that on rivers
where there were Indian reservations Winters could disrupt estab
lished economies and retard future growth. And the Court surely
knew that removing the requirement of use as the basis of water
rights, would undermine prior appropriation as the rule of choice in
the West.
Shurts addresses this apparent anomaly by questioning the as
sumption that prior appropriation was so entrenched in 1 908 as to ad
mit no other rule. Distancing himself from Norris Hundley, the emi-

18. Nat'! Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 718-24 (Cal. 1983).
19. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at
40-47 (1977).
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nent historian whose account of Winters has been the standard,20 he
asserts that the government had at its disposal other legal theories that
could have justified water claims for the reservation and that some
were part of the fabric of western, even Montana, water law. In par
ticular, he argues that the doctrine of riparian rights was still viable
and that this fact made it more plausible that a court might depart
from prior appropriation. To bolster the plausibility that an alternative
theory of water law could succeed, he cites evidence that the Indian
reserved rights doctrine actually was compatible with non-Indian goals
(pp. 27-34).
Shurts's research does build a strong case that some non-Indians
stood to gain when the Fort Belknap Reservation was awarded water
rights superior to its upstream neighbors. But I believe that he strives
too hard to recast the context framed by Hundley. I remain uncon
vinced that the survival of vestiges of riparian law made it a viable al
ternative for the attorney litigating the case or for the Supreme Court.
By focusing on the existence of local non-Indian self-interest, the
author does help explain how local non-Indians might have supported
prosecution of the case and the results of the decision. Yet, the re
served rights doctrine surely threatened more non-Indian water users
across the West than it benefited.
In the West, riparian rights have been most important in states
along the Pacific coast and those straddling the one-hundredth merid
ian that generally divides the humid east from the arid lands beyond.
Although Shurts and others have successfully debunked any essential
connection between climate and doctrine (pp. 38-40) it does not follow
that riparian law ever stood a chance of acceptance throughout the
West. Riparianism was considered to be starkly inflexible and so it
rapidly diminished in importance. Some states initially embraced it, as
in Colorado, before roundly discarding it. Others accepted it indi
rectly, incorporating the common law by reference.
Riparian law had its greatest influence in California. The situation
there was skewed because a few politically favored magnates reaped
fortunes by abusing the natural flow extremity of riparianism. Henry
Miller, the legendary cattle baron, won the "right" to have seasonal
flows of the copious San Joaquin River sprawl across his Central Val
ley hay meadows, unimpeded by the uses of any upstream farmers or
ranchers.2 1 Yet the state constitution was amended to correct this ex
travagance and tame the potential of riparian rights by requiring them
to be reasonable relative to other water uses.

20. Norris Hundley, Jr., The "Winters" Decision and Indian Water Rights: A Mystery
Reexamined, 13 W. HIST. Q. 17 (1982).
21. Lux v. Haggin, 10 P. 674 (Cal. 1886); see DONALD J. PISANI, FROM THE FAMILY
FARM TO AGRIBUSINESS 191 -249 (1984) (discussing Lux).
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State laws in California and other states continually whittled away
at riparian rights. The dominant economic interests in the West were,
on balance, better served if those who settled the vast lands in be
tween the West's sparsely located waterways could get water rights
rather than if those who happened to take up homesteads or mining
claims along the rivers had a monopoly on water. So most states sim
ply replaced riparian rights with prior appropriation. Some states
abolished riparian rights except to the extent they were actually used
as of some arbitrary date. This wiped out any special value of riparian
rights, as distinguished from appropriative rights, by tying them to use.
California perpetuated the fiction that riparian owners had inchoate
water rights that they could start using at any time in the future. But
this was rendered almost meaningless by statutes effectively subordi
nating unexercised rights to all water uses that existed at the time
rights in the river were adjudicated.22
Not only was the sun setting on riparianism in the West as a matter
of law by the early twentieth century, but politicians and development
interests spoke out zealously against it while venerating prior appro
priation. Shurts recognizes the western mindset: "[People] whose lives
depended in part on the use of water or rights to water use were accus
tomed to thinking primarily in terms of the prior appropriation sys
tem" (p. 65).
Shurts correctly points out that riparian law had been repudiated
in Montana when the Winters case was filed (p. 43). An 1865 territorial
statute replaced it with prior appropriation. Nevertheless, he argues
that two rather ambiguous territorial cases showed that riparian law
was considered by some judges to have vitality. But then Montana be
came a state in 1889, and revised its water laws in 1895 in part to clear
up any ambiguities that had led judges in such cases to opine that a
modified riparian system might exist. Shurts acknowledges that the re
vision "put an end to arguments against the existence or reach of the
prior appropriation system based on uncertainties or ambiguities in
prior statutes and court cases" (p. 46).
But Shurts still reads a 1900 case2 3 as keeping open the possibility
that fragments of riparian rights lurked in Montana. In that case, dicta
suggested that if lands unaffected by anyone's appropriations had
passed into private hands before the 1895 code the owner might be
able to claim riparian rights. I have trouble reading the case as holding
out any realistic hope for riparian rights claims. Apparently others saw
it this way, too. The Montana Supreme Court said several years later,
in a case specifically repudiating a riparian claim, that "since the or22 . See Rowland v. Ramelli (In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys.), 599 P.2d
656 (Cal. 1979) (upholding the legislature's grant of authority to the water board to limit ri
parian claims).
.

23. Smith v. Dennif, 60 P. 398 (Mont. 1900).
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ganization of Montana territory - a period of more than fifty years no owner, claimant, or occupant of riparian land has ever asserted in
the courts the common-law doctrine of riparian rights, as applied to
the use of water, until the present action was instituted. .. ."24
Shurts seems to conclude that Carl Rasch, the young United States
Attorney who litigated Winters, did nothing out of the ordinary when
he pursued riparian rights for the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation.
He says that "any competent attorney for the government would have
to have been aware of these legal possibilities" (p. 61). But Rasch
must have known it was a longshot when he argued for riparian rights
in the trial and appellate courts. He was entirely unsuccessful in these
attempts, yet he won when the Court based its decision in favor of the
Indians on another theory that was not part of the water law of any ju
risdiction - reserved rights.
As applied to water, reserved rights created the same fundamental
problem as riparian rights in the context of a prior appropriation sys
tem. The prior appropriation doctrine was bedeviled by the charac
teristic of reserved rights that allowed them to exist without any use of
water. This would enable reserved rights holders to start using water
years after an appropriator had begun using it, and defeat the appro
priator. It is this issue that led to the widespread and bitter reaction
against the decision in Winters.
As soon as the decision was handed down, the Montana legislature
enacted memorials vigorously denouncing it and predicting that it
"will seriously and permanently stifle prosperity" (pp. 65-66). And
outside Montana there was a chorus of indignant criticism.
Shurts finds evidence that these views were not universal. Some lo
cal news accounts treated the outcome in Winters as a matter of fact
rather than with the outrage and near panic that were expressed by
members of Congress and others who viewed it from a national or re
gional perspective. Non-Indian water users who diverted water below
the Fort Belknap Reservation would benefit if the reservation's prior
ity could command the flow of water past the upstream non-Indians.
These downstream users were - like most water users - more inter
ested in getting water than in doctrine. Non-Indians in the area also
could benefit politically because the greater demand on the Milk
River gave weight to their campaign for construction of a federally fi
nanced water project. Moreover, it appears from Shurts's account that
non-Indians were doing most of the farming on the reservation and
would be the primary beneficiaries of the "Indian water" (pp. 78-82).
The presence of local support may help explain why the U.S. At
torney might pursue a controversial case vigorously. But it does not
undermine the idea that attorney Rasch acted boldly - whether it was
24. Mettler v. Ames Realty Co., 201 P. 702 (Mont. 1921).
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for the sake of the nation's obligations to Indians, or to please his cho
sen faction of non-Indian irrigators, or some combination of the two.
He pursued riparian law after it had been largely rejected in Montana
and much of the West and when it was eschewed by the government
who employed him. After all, his world consisted of more than a group
of settlers in the dust-bitten, chilly frontier towns of northern
Montana. Rasch's professional life and his future were tied to pleasing
his superiors in Washington. They were, it seems, quite preoccupied
with doctrine.
Federal policy, and the federal litigating position in water cases,
plainly embraced prior appropriation as the water law doctrine of
choice for the West and disfavored riparian law. The reasons for this
ranged from a perception that appropriation would advance the cru
sade for the Reclamation Act program of federally subsidized dam
building across the West, to a desire to prevent inconsistency in the
government's litigating position at a time when it was trumpeting the
prior appropriation doctrine in the United States Supreme Court.25
The President of the United States had delivered a message in 1901
emphatically stating the national policy of favoring prior appropria
tion (p. 96). And it was the conventional wisdom that if riparian law
persisted, "the development of the entire arid West [would] be mate
rially retarded, if not entirely destroyed" (p. 97; alteration in original).
Shurts illustrates the pervasiveness of such attitudes. He cites the
views of a government attorney that "practically all the wealth now
existing in the arid region was created by and is dependent upon the
doctrine of the appropriation of waters" and that "should the doctrine
of riparian law be now established in said arid region, further devel
opment would cease, the Reclamation Act would become inoperative,
existing wealth would be destroyed and the country [would] practically
become depopulated" (pp. 92-93).
As Shurts discovered in his research, Reclamation officials had
their sights set on eradicating riparian doctrine and enshrining prior
appropriation so that they could make "rights to water wholly de
pendent on diversion and actual use" (p. 85). When these federal offi
cials learned the true nature of Winters after the government had al
ready won in the trial court they were "horrified," became "positively
hostile, even apoplectic," and "viewed with abhorrence" Rasch's ri
parian claims (pp. 85-86).
Rasch had not told his superiors that he would be arguing the
dreaded riparian theory. He had gotten authority from Washington
only to take action "to protect interests of Indians against interference
by subsequent appropriators of waters of Milk River" (p. 68). He did
25. This was the position of the United States in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907),
and the Department of Justice did not want to risk jeopardizing it by taking an inconsistent
position in the Winters case. Pp. 89-102.
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mention to the local Indian agent that he was arguing riparian law in
another Montana Indian water rights case and that he would raise it in
Winters as well, but said that "the principal proposition in the case is
the use that was made of the waters for beneficial purposes upon the
reservation," i.e., prior appropriation.26 No wonder Washington was
irate.
Shurts recounts the drama of Rasch's ensuing struggle to get the
Justice Department to approve going forward with his theories on ap
peal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States
Supreme Court. Rasch confessed that he had relied on riparian law,
but explained that, having discovered that the reservation actually be
gan using water after the non-Indians, he deemed it the strongest
ground in the case (pp. 87-88). Even with the inertia of a government
victory in hand, it was difficult to get permission to defend it against
the white homesteaders' appeal.Ultimately, the issue was reviewed by
President Theodore Roosevelt. When the President solicited his views,
the Secretary of the Interior resolved a bitter internal conflict among
his own subordinates - Indian affairs officials who favored the appeal
and Reclamation interests who opposed it - and concluded that the
case was "exceptional" because it was the only way to protect Indian
rights. The case went forward and when the Solicitor General took it
over in the Supreme Court he continued to argue Rasch's riparian law
ground (p. 100).
C. Sua Sponte: A Trial Court's Invention ofIndian
Reserved Water Rights
Curiously, the Winters decision from the Supreme Court and, as
Shurts illustrates, the decisions in the lower courts, were not grounded
in riparian law at all. The decisions were based squarely on a recent
Indian law decision, United States v. Winans, that upheld the rights of
Indians to cross private property to get to their old fishing areas along
the Columbia River in Washington, because they had retained off
reservation fishing rights in a treaty.27 The salient principles of that
case were that, in a treaty with Indians, any rights or property not ex
pressly ceded are retained and, where ambiguities exist in treaty inter
pretation, they are to be resolved in favor of Indians. The trial court
and court of appeals stressed that the intention of the government and
26. P. 72. Shurts says that this was "an apparent reference to a Rio Grande reserved
treaty rights approach." Id. Although in United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U.S.
690 (1899), the Supreme Court said state water law could not "destroy the right of the
United States as owner of lands bordering on a stream to the continued flow - so far, at
least, as might be necessary for the beneficial use of the government property," the language
Rasch used and the scope of his authority suggests he was referring to a prior appropriation
claim.
-

27. 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
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the Indians when they entered into an agreement in 1 888 was to settle
the Indians on the Fort Belknap Reservation and that irrigation was
necessary to accomplish that purpose.28
These were not Rasch's ideas. He did plead that allowing upstream
use would be "violative of the treaties" but he did not stress Winans to
the trial court, although it had emanated from the Supreme Court just
before he filed the case. Nevertheless, the trial judge made Winans the
foundation of his decision. Inexplicably, even after inadvertently win
ning on this theory, Rasch used the decision only cursorily in his brief
to the court of appeals. He apparently did not believe in it and chose
to continue emphasizing riparian rights (pp. 57-58). He might have
muted or confused some of the opposition to his appeal in his battles
with Washington had he framed the matter as a peculiar Indian law
issue resolvable by reference to the Winans reserved rights theory
rather than as one that implicated fundamental principles of western
water law. Either he never grasped the significance of the reserved
rights theory or he did not feel that it would hold up on appeal.
Given the clarity of the Montana trial judge's understanding and
articulation of the reserved rights doctrine of Indian water rights, it is
difficult not to see U.S. Attorney Rasch as rather hardheaded. He
unrelentingly advocated riparian law; never mind that neither of the
courts below bought the theory. If we are looking for the champion of
Indian reserved water rights it is U.S. District Judge William H. Hunt
because it was he who extended the reserved rights doctrine from the
treaty fishing rights context of Winans to water rights (pp. 72-74).
Rasch may have been too close to the matter to see it as anything but
a water rights case. The lower courts understood that it was a matter
of sustaining the foundations of Indian law, and so did the Supreme
Court in an opinion by Justice McKenna, who was also the author of
the Winans decision a few years before.
II.

INDIAN LAW:

A TRADITION OF JUDICIAL RESTRAINT

Water law is characterized, first, by judicial announcements of
starched doctrines that appear to have Talmudic significance. But if
doctrine - whether based on riparian concepts or notions of prior ap
propriation - fails to protect investments and settled expectations, or
impedes social progress, then courts will heap on exceptions and quali
fications to fit contemporary utilitarian demands. And if the courts fail
to do this, legislatures will step in and modify the system. Water law's
mission, then, has been to serve the forces of social change, without
substantially interrupting vested interests.

28. Winters v. United States, 143 F. 740, 745-49 (9th Cir. 1906). The trial court's memo
randum order is quoted in full in Shurts. Pp. 72-74.
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Federal Indian law, by contrast, historically has been marked by
judicial decisions resistant to the intrusion of social change into Indian
country enclaves, at least until Congress has made clear an intention
to alter the situation. Courts have honored two, occasionally conflict
ing, principles: Indian tribes have a right to maintain the integrity of
their lands and autonomous societies; and Congress has almost unbri
dled power to manage, and change, Indian policy.
So the Supreme Court has made sure that treaties are honored,
that states are excluded from imposing their laws in Indian country,
and that tribes can pursue self-determination. But whenever Congress,
in its presumed wisdom, wants to destroy tribal rights, the Court has
deferred. The judicial role in Indian law, then, has been agnostic to
pleas of social necessity for change. Neither the Court's perceptions of
contemporary conditions, nor non-Indian pleas based on inequity or
obsolescence of Indian rights, have prevailed.
A legal realist finds nothing exceptional in judicial adjustments of
doctrine that conform it to changing conditions. Water law follows this
mode, ballasted by property notions that tend to restrict the ambit of
change. It is Indian law that is exceptional, with its often uncontextu
alized results, its relative timelessness.29 It seems to me that Winters
never would have emanated from the Supreme Court if it had been
"merely" a water law case. It can be better explained, and understood,
as an Indian law case.
A.

The Supreme Court as a Bulwark of Indian Rights

Indian law historically has been distinguished by jurisprudence that
seems to defy contemporary political winds. From the first Supreme
Court until the Rehnquist Court, Indian rights have survived all but
express congressional abrogation. The Court's landmark cases in In
dian law have been bulwarks against the erosion of Indian rights by
the forces of non-Indian economic and social interests.
Perhaps sensing that relations between aboriginally sovereign
tribes and the United States are essentially a political matter, and that
the relationship is constitutionally defined in the Commerce Clause,
the Court has been largely unwilling to restrict Indian rights by inter
pretation. This trait has aroused loud conflicts over the rights of states
and the impacts on non-Indians. While the Court has remained imper
vious to the resulting political pressures, however, it has also unques
tioningly deferred to curtailing Indian rights once Congress has spo
ken.

29. Charles F. Wilkinson, in AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAw 32 (1987), says,
"The modern cases reflect the premise that tribes should be insulated against the passage of
time."
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In the Cherokee Cases,30 Georgia tried to assert its laws over the
territory of the Cherokees within the state. 3 1 Chief Justice John
Marshall's opinion rebuked the State of Georgia for violating the
Cherokee Nation's rights of self-government and conflicting with
Congress's exclusive authority to regulate such matters.
Andrew Jackson, before running for president, vociferously sup
ported Georgia's claim to sovereignty over Cherokee lands and advo
cated removal of the Indian tribes from the territory of the states. As
President, he was unmoved by the Cherokees' pleas for protection
against Georgia's encroachments on their lands and for enforcement
of the guarantees of independence anchored in treaties. This touched
off one of the nation's earliest and bitterest federalism conflicts.
The Cherokees' first attempt to get judicial relief was dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction, but Chief Justice John Marshall's opinion was
couched in sympathetic language that characterized the relationship of
tribes to the United States as having constitutional dimensions. The
Commerce Clause gave Congress power over Indian affairs, and put
the federal government in the position of "guardian." 3 2 In a second
case, Marshall found the Georgia laws regulating matters in Indian
country "repugnant to the constitution, treaties, and laws of the
United States." 3 3 Georgia effectively was told that its laws were invalid
on the Cherokee Reservation, a vast area within its boundaries where
gold had been discovered. Instead, supreme federal law secured the
Cherokee Nation's power of self-government within its territory.
Georgia refused to obey the mandate of the Court and was sup
ported by President Jackson. Legend holds that it is of this decision
Jackson said "John Marshall has made his decision, now let him en
force it. " 3 4
The Cherokee Cases touched off a constitutional crisis. Former
President John Quincy Adams declared that "[t]he Union is in the
most imminent danger of dissolution. . . . The ship is about to foun
der."35 The nation survived, however, and so did the decision with its
sweeping, and persistently unpopular, preemption of state laws and
recognition of tribal sovereignty in Indian country. The Cherokees did
30. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).

v.

Georgia, 30

31. On the history surrounding the Cherokee Cases, see generally 4 ALBERT J.
BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (1919); 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1922); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT
AND CULTURAL CHANGE: 1815-35 (1988); and Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A
Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500 (1969).
32. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
33. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 562-63.
34. MARQUIS JAMES, THE LIFE OF ANDREW JACKSON 603 (1938).
35. 4 BEVERIDGE, supra note 31, at 544 (second alteration in original).
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not fare so well; they were later removed in the Trail of Tears to what
is now Oklahoma. 3 6
Other Indian law cases have demanded heroic advocacy and judi
cial resistance to popular will and political trends. For instance, in the
late nineteenth century, popular sentiment against tribalism was
strong. There was pressure to open up already shrunken reservations
to white settlement and the policy of moving tribes out of the way of
settlement to their own enclaves and allowing them to manage their
own affairs became nearly impossible to maintain.
The government turned its attention to controlling Indian life
within the reservations in order to "civilize" the Indians. The goal,
which resonated with both the well-intentioned, self-styled friends of
the American Indian and those bent on settling the West, became as
similation. 37 Conveniently, this involved opening the reservations to
land-hungry non-Indians who would come in to take up lands that
were deemed surplus after tribal holdings were parceled out to indi
vidual Indians. The non-Indians gained land but would serve as exam
ples of individual enterprise for the Indians. By giving each Indian a
piece of what had belonged to the whole tribe, communalism would
end and the Indians would be induced to shed their "old and injurious
habits . . . [f]requent feasts, community in food, heathen ceremonies,
and dances, constant visiting." 38 Traditional religious and cultural
practices were reviled and forcibly repressed. 39 "Civilizing" the Indian,
it was thought, depended on destruction of Indian culture and reserva
tions. And Indian children were to be civilized by removing them frqm
their families and putting them in boarding schools, where they were
forced to give up their dress, language, religious practices, attitudes,
and families. 40
To supplant tribal government and end the influence of traditional
leaders, Indian agents were put in charge of law and order on reserva
tions. 41 The agents eventually ran their own police and courts under an
36. See RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS - CHEROKEE LAw FROM
CLAN TO COURT 65-67 (1975).
37. See generally HENRY E. FRITZ, THE MOVEMENT FOR INDIAN ASSIMILATION, 18601890 (1963); 2 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 609-58 (1984).
38. Readjustment of Indian Affairs: Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House Comm.
on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 9, at 430 (statement of Delos S. Otis, quoting agent
for Yankton Sioux) (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. See ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 290-94
(1970); JENNINGS c. WISE, THE RED MAN IN THE NEW WORLD DRAMA 289-91 (Vine
Deloria, Jr. ed., 1971).
40. See PETER FARB, MAN'S RISE TO CIVILIZATION AS SHOWN BY THE INDIANS OF
NORTH AMERICA FROM PRIMEVAL TIMES TO THE COMING OF THE INDUSTRIAL STATE
257-61 (1968).
41. See generally WILLIAM T. HAGAN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES (1966); Russel
Lawrence Barsh & J. Youngblood Henderson, Tribal Courts, the Model Code, and the Police
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administratively promulgated federal code. This was part of the
scheme to educate and tame Indians for their own good and the safety
of their new neighbors.4 2 The assimilation policy and the authority of
the Indian agents were directly threatened by the continuation of tra
ditional tribal justice.
So the Bureau of Indian Affairs pressed Congress for legislation
that would extend federal jurisdiction over reservation crimes. A law
was passed allowing prosecution of federal crimes in Indian country,
but it excepted crimes involving only Indians.4 3 Nevertheless, federal
prosecutions in these matters proceeded. In one such case, Ex Parte
Crow Dog,44 the Supreme Court dealt a blow to the assimilation policy
when it set aside the conviction and death sentence of a Sioux Indian
who had murdered another Sioux on the reservation. The murderer
had already been sanctioned by the tribal council and tribal peace
makers required payments and restitution to the victim's family. The
government argued that a rather ambiguous treaty provision allowed
federal prosecution, but the Court said that to depart from the "high
est and best" promise of "self-government" in the treaty would re
quire a "clear expression of the intention of Congress."45 Only after
the assimilation policy was embodied in quite specific legislation did
the Court uphold its application.46
To be sure, the Court's decision in Crow Dog ran against popular
opinion and federal policy of the time. But it comported with a tradi
tion of tribal independence and of safeguarding the aboriginal auton
omy and treaty rights of Indian tribes unless and until Congress plainly
abrogated those prerogatives.
Through the years, the Supreme Court has gone against the tide of
social change to prevent the deterioration of Indian rights in many
other noteworthy cases. In Winans it found that a Northwest fishing
tribe's retention of fishing rights on lands ceded to the government by
treaty implicitly impressed the land with a perpetual easement across
the ceded land to get to the river to fish, even after the land was patIdea in American Policy, in AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE LAW 25 (Lawrence Rosen ed.,
1 976).

42. See United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575, 577 (D. Or. 1888) (describing the courts im
posed on reservations as "educational and disciplinary instrumentalities, by which the gov
ernment of the United States is endeavoring to improve and elevate the condition of these
dependent tribes.").
43. Act of Feb. 18, 1875, ch. 80, 18 stat. 316, 318 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1 152 (1994)).

44. 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
45. Id. at 568, 572.
46. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (sustaining the decision of
Congress to allot tribal lands contrary to a treaty promise); United States v. Kagama, 118
U.S. 375 (1886) (upholding the enactment of the Major Crimes Act, now codified at 18
u.s.c. § 1 153 (1994)).
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ented to non-Indians.47 At a time when society revered the hard work
and grit of settlers, the decision cracked the non-Indians' thriving
fishing monopoly on the river and gave tribal members an opportunity
to use an old treaty promise as a means of economic and cultural sur
vival.
Even where Congress has spoken and instituted policies curbing
Indian rights, the Court has been conservative in construing the im
pact on tribal rights. In the 1960s, at the height of an eventually aban
doned "termination" policy under which Congress had ordered sev
eral reservations dismantled and tribes disbanded, the Supreme Court
surprisingly held that a terminated tribe retained its fishing rights.48
The Court cited venerable authority that held that " 'the intention to
abrogate or modify a treaty right is not to be lightly imputed to the
Congress.' "49
Just as the Court has upheld the extensive power of Congress to
take away tribal rights and powers, it has also sustained exercises of
power that single out Indians for special benefits. In Morton v.
Mancari,50 the Court upheld an act of Congress giving an employment
preference to Indians in the Indian service. It rejected non-Indian ob
jections based on the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.5 1 It
said that the law made a political distinction and therefore did not re
sult in racial discrimination because the Constitution specifically em
powered Congress to deal with tribes as governments. It would have
been easy in the 1970s to construe the civil rights laws as ultimately
working more to the benefit of Indians than laws that perpetuated
their special legal treatment. But the Court adhered to the judicial
traditions of Indian law.
Through the 1970s and 1980s, an unprecedented number of Indian
cases came before the Supreme Court. As growing non-Indian com
munities and economies closed in on Indian country, states tried to
impose taxes and regulations on reservation activities. Tribes, too, ex
erted more of their governmental powers. Jurisdictional conflicts led
to judicial challenges. The "modern era," as it was called by Charles
Wilkinson, was marked by dozens of cases in which the Supreme
Court vindicated tribal claims of immunity from state law, exempted
non-Indians from taxes and regulatory laws on reservations if they
would in any way interfere with federal purposes, and validated tribal
authority to govern even non-Indians in Indian country.52 Thus, tribes
47. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
48. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
49. Id. at 413 (quoting Pigeon River Co. v. Cox Co., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934)).
50. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
51. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
52. See WILKINSON, supra note 29, at 1-2.
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were able to collect taxes from non-Indian energy companies produc
ing oil and gas on reservations,s 3 and non-Indian contractors were held
exempt from state taxes when building a school on a reservation.s 4 In
dian treaties were also interpreted to allow large shares of commercial
fisheries to be harvested by Indians in the Northwest to the detriment
of established non-Indian fishers.ss
All of these cases were contentious and implicated the sovereignty
of states. Many of them resulted in serious economic impacts for the
states and for non-Indian businesses. It is fair to surmise that there
would have been no political outcry if the Indians had lost in these
cases. There was an outcry when they won.
The significance of having a judiciary able to insulate tribes from
the mood swings of politics and social attitudes has been brought
home by the sharp change in the Supreme Court's approach to Indian
cases since the mid-1980s. By getting actively involved in the cases and
trying to do what is best for mainstream society, rather than continu
ing the tradition of upholding Indian rights and sovereignty unless
Congress has clearly divested the tribes of them, the Rehnquist Court
has begun to erode the foundations of Indian law.s6 The contrast with
the prior century and one-half of Indian law is striking. It may be too
early, however, to conclude that the Court's departures of the last fif
teen or so years have permanently changed the course of Indian law.
In any event, seeing the Supreme Court as an institution willing to ele
vate Indian cases above the broader social and economic context accu
rately portrays the legal milieu of Winters.
B. Winters: In the Indian Law Tradition
United States v. Winters is one of the bulwark cases of Indian law.
It preserves tribal water rights that were not expressly ceded by the
Indians or extinguished by the government. It applies ancient canons
of construction that favor interpretations resolving ambiguities "from
the standpoint of the Indians."s7 The agreement between the tribes of
the Fort Belknap Reservation and the government was silent as to wa
ter rights. So the Indians' right to sufficient water to fulfill the intent of
their agreement survived the cession of land.
The Supreme Court opinion was written by a westerner who un
derstood the profound impact the decision would have on settlers who
53. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
54. Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 45,8 U.S. 832 (1982).
55. Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658 (1979).
56. See David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of
the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573 (1996).
57. 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908).
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had homesteaded former Indian lands. 58 He knew that the water rights
perfected by the settlers under state law were already being used by
them. He knew how disruptive it would be if the settlers' water rights
were subordinated to future rights reserved for irrigating Indian reser
vations. He understood the equities. The non-Indian settlers had been
drawn West by the promise of homesteads where they could farm and
prosper, and their livelihoods and investments were at stake. Every
one knew that successful farming would take irrigation and the settlers
had been told that they only needed to claim water rights for their
homesteads under state law.
The government had created an impossible situation where its im
plied representations to the settlers could not be fulfilled if the intent
of the agreement with the Indians was satisfied. Justice McKenna
wrote: "We realize that there is a conflict of implications, but that
which makes for the retention of the waters [by the Indians] is of
greater force than that which makes for their cession."59
The Indian law principles used by McKenna to reach his decision
were not revolutionary. Although Winters was the first case to apply
these principles to water rights, they can be traced to some of the old
est cases in Indian law.60 The concept that Indian rights predated the
United States and that the United States is obliged to protect them
against encroachment by those asserting state law, and the rule that
these rights must be explicitly extinguished by the Congress, trace to
the Cherokee Cases.61 So does the instruction to read provisions in In
dian treaties favorably to the Indians,6 2 which had been reiterated by
the Court in other cases by the time of Winters. 6 3
Yet, there is no doubt that Winters stunned McKenna's fellow
westerners. Shurts sees the opinion as "unremarkable" in the sense
that the theories had been vented in the lower courts and were merely
applications of McKenna's decision in Winans (p. 144). But observers
found plenty about which to remark. Shurts says that after the court of
appeals decision there were "stories and editorials of criticism and
outrage" in nearby towns, although some newspapers treated it with a
more neutral tone (pp. 104-05). If the reaction of communities along
the Milk River was mixed, criticism across the West was generally ve
hement. For instance, a Wyoming Congressman called the decision

58. Shurts reports that Justice McKenna was solidly connected to the establishment of
western economic interests and political influence. P. 163.
59. 207 U.S. at 576.
60. See Richard B. Collins, The Future Course of the Winters Doctrine, 56 U. COLO. L.
REV. 481, 482-83 (1985).
61. Worcester v Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 544-49, 551-54, 562 (1832).
62. See id. at 551-54; id. at 582 (McLean, J., concurring in the judgment).
63. E.g. , Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. l, 11 (1899).
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"monstrous," because it "may stay development until the crack of
doom because there is somebody too indolent or too indifferent to de
velop or allow development" (p. 66). To this day, the legal literature
seethes with commentary on the decision and its consequences.64
I cannot agree with Shurts's conclusion that "Winters fit right in"
because at the time there was a "diversity of viewpoints" on water (pp.
163-64). First, I have questioned in the preceding section whether, by
the time of Winters, the existence of a few vestiges of riparian law left
open a viable debate over whether prior appropriation would pre
dominate. Second, the decision was treated like a bombshell that did
not fit in at all with the water rights trends of western water law. If
Winters "fits" anywhere, it is within Indian law's historical tradition of
sustaining tribal rights whether or not broader policy interests are
served.
III.

RESERVED RIGHTS IN PRACTICE

For all the fears it has evoked, and its purported potency, one
would think that in ninety years Winters would have produced tangible
results. Indian reservations would have blossomed and their economic
advantages over neighboring non-Indian communities would be ap
parent. The opposite is true. At least for the past few decades, re
served rights claims have become a central, and complicating, factor in
adjudications of water rights, yet the consequences in terms of Indian
benefits or disruptions of non-Indian uses are sparse. This is partly
owing to the paucity of capital for tribes to invest in the infrastructure
to develop and use water. It is also because only a few dozen tribes
have been able to achieve adjudications to make their reserved rights
enforceable. The blame has generally been placed at the feet of the
federal government for failing to assert reserved rights until recently.
That failure, in turn, has allegedly lulled.non-Indians into a false sense
of security that would be unfairly disrupted by latter-day assertions of
reserved rights.
Shurts's research belies claims that the sudden invocation of re
served water rights in the late twentieth century constitutes an unfair
attempt to disinter an arcane and unripe principle. This answers argu
ments that, if the doctrine is to be applied at all, it should be modified
to avoid disruption of non-Indian uses. Now, I never could subscribe
to the unfair surprise ground for objecting to reserved rights claims.
Since 1 908, no one could read Winters and miss the fundamental point:
all water rights on streams near Indian reservations are potentially
subject to superior Indian claims. Whether or not the government ac
tively pursued Indian water rights on reservations around the West af64. I have found at least forty-five law review articles focusing primarily on aspects of
the reserved water rights doctrine that have been published in the last twenty years.
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ter it won Winters should not matter. It is the job of investors and law
yers to inquire into the nature and security of property rights and to
take account of the risks. A long delay in enforcement while tribes suf
fered an incapacity to develop their water rights should not evoke too
much sympathy - especially for non-Indians who were beneficiaries
of federally subsidized water development on many of the same
streams where Indian claims lie.65
Whatever the merits of the argument might be, Shurts attempts to
show that the government was, indeed, actively involved in advancing
reserved water rights claims in the several years following the decision.
He acknowledges that the government did not press reserved rights in
water litigation in the first years following the decision and thus the
doctrine "remained a misunderstood novelty" (p. 185). Shurts argues,
however, that the doctrine was not entirely moribund. He cites a failed
attempt by an Indian affairs official to get legislative recognition of re
served rights, a flurry of rhetoric in Congress on the same subject,
matched by opposing rhetoric glorifying prior appropriation law, vari
ous examples of congressional and Indian agency awareness of the
need to litigate Indian water claims, and discussions of extending re
served rights claims beyond Indian reservations to federal lands (pp.
184-222). This proves that members of Congress and Indian affairs of
ficials were aware of the reserved rights doctrine and that eventually
some water rights claims were, indeed, pursued.
Shurts concludes that the government did use the doctrine, "often,
and to some effect" (p. 252). He illustrates with a case study of the
government's litigation of claims for the Uintah Reservation of the
Northern Utes in Utah. This case study is meant to exemplify that
"contrary to conventional understanding of what happened to Winters
in the first decades after the original decision, in this instance [federal]
officials aggressively pursued a Winters claim" (p. 246). The Ute case
shows, instead, how unaggressive the United States was, notwith
standing its potent victory in Winters. The story reveals that the gov
ernment selectively advocated reserved rights to advance the welfare
of non-Indians.
After agonizing over whether to assert rights for the reservation at
all, the government attorney decided not to insist on all of the reserva
tion's legal entitlement (p. 230). He felt that it would "not be just" to
the settlers because they had come there "practically under an invita
tion from the Government" (p. 238). Of course, this was exactly the
situation of the upstream settlers who lost out in Winters. Moreover, it
appears that the reserved rights claims for the Uintah Reservation
were made primarily for the benefit of non-Indians who had leased
65. See UNITED STATES NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE
FUTURE - FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES 474-75 (1973).
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most of the irrigated land on the reservation (pp. 233-34, 239). The
government invoked the doctrine to give the non-Indians who occu
pied Indian lands the advantage of an earlier priority under the um
brella of Indians' reserved rights so they could use water to the detri
ment of other non-Indian farmers off the reservation whose water
rights depended on state law.
The most shocking story of all in the aftermath of Winters seems to
have occurred back on the Fort Belknap Reservation itself. Shurts ex
plains that after the court entered a final decree giving the reservation
5000 inches of water (almost all the average flow during the irrigation
season) the upstream non-Indian irrigators refused to obey the decree
and took all or most of the water out upstream. Federal officials
quickly compromised and settled for 2500 inches - half the amount of
water the reservation was entitled to receive (pp. 107-08). It was a dry
year and so perhaps the officials felt obliged to compromise. But there
are enough other facts that, when pieced together, arouse concern
about the good faith of the federal officials with respect to the Indians
who should have benefited from their ostensible water-rights victory.
Shurts could find little evidence of an Indian stake or involvement
in the litigation. He tells us that non-Indians farmed about half of the
irrigated lands at Fort Belknap at the time. Indeed, the superintendent
himself grazed cattle on the reservation. Most of the farmers were
there under leases arranged by the reservation superintendent, and
some were there because they had married Indian women. Indians
objected to the superintendent's leasing program for the reservation
(pp.27-33).
While Shurts disputes the basis of another commentator's conclu
sion that the Winters litigation was motivated by a desire specifically to
benefit the downstream and on-reservation non-Indians, he agrees
that the outcome favored non-Indians. We know, too, from his re
search that some years after the decision an inspector reported that
Indians had heard of the decision but had not seen its fruits. One In
dian said: "This year all these ditches are dry, and we will not raise
anything, and I think we will starve off this winter" (p. 187).
A project ripe for Shurts or another historian is an exploration of
what went wrong after Winters. If Indians did not benefit, why? Who
did benefit? Did officials at Fort Belknap continue to settle for half of
the tribe's entitlement after the drought year? Did they settle for half
because that was enough for the half of the reservation land that was
then being cultivated by non-Indians? Did the flaccid federal support
for Indian irrigation have anything to do with the fact that Congress
was considering, at the behest of non-Indian neighbors, legislation to
open up the irrigable lands of the reservation for non-Indian settle
ment and ownership?
The most vexing question of all is why, eighty years after they
theoretically won the best water rights in the West, most tribes are on
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Indian reservations that are parched and undeveloped? In the 1970s,
the National Water Commission concluded that: "In the history of the
United States Government's treatment of Indian tribes, its failure to
protect Indian water rights . . . is one of the sorrier chapters."66 The
Commission put much of the blame on the fact that the United States
was focused on developing the very same waters that could be claimed
by Indians to be used instead in big water projects for the benefit of
non-Indians. The political dynamics that contributed to the failure to
develop Indian water rights are thoroughly examined by Daniel
McCool.67 The problem has even darker causes; it is well documented
that the United States has actually compromised its legal advocacy of
tribal water rights when faced with conflicts of interest.68 Whatever the
causes, the reality is that a tiny percentage of irrigable acreage on res
ervations is actually irrigated - only seven percent as of 1984.69 This
includes acreage served by the meager irrigation systems that have
been built on reservations, but even these are in such disrepair that
they approach uselessness.70
Most observers would have to agree that in the last two decades of
the twentieth century, Indian reserved rights were more frequently
and vigorously applied than at any other time. One major case went to
judgment in the Wyoming Supreme Court, which awarded a large
share of the water from the Big Horn River to the Wind River Indian
Reservation.71 The decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court but
nearly was reversed because the Justices were worried that the judg
ment portended dislocations for non-Indian irrigators. An opinion
demanding "sensitivity" to the impact on non-Indian appropriators in
the application of reserved rights was almost issued.72 Today, there are
some sixty Indian water-rights cases pending in courts around the
West. Potentially at stake are claims to water totaling more than four
times the annual flow of the Colorado River.73
66. Id. at 475.
67. DANIEL MCCOOL, COMMAND OF THE WATERS: IRON TRIANGLES, FEDERAL
WATER DEVELOPMENT, AND INDIAN WATER (1987).
68. See SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 91ST CONG., A STUDY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
IN THE PROTECTION OF INDIAN NATURAL RESOURCES 5-19 (Comm. Print 1971) (written
by Reid Peyton Chambers).
69. MCCOOL, supra note 67, at 159
70. WESTERN WATER POLICY REVIEW ADVISORY COMMISSION, WATER IN THE WEST:
CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 3-48 (1998).
71. In re Gen. Adjudication of all Rights to Use Water in the Big Hom Sys., 753 P.2d 76,
affd mem. by an equally divided Court sub. nom.. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406
(1989).
72 See Getches, supra note 56, at 1640-41 .
..

73. WESTERN WATER POLICY REVIEW ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 70, at 2-28
(stating that claims could affect 60 million acre-feet of water).
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But the saga of the Big Horn decision seems to have moved many
Indian water rights cases out of the courts. Daunted by what the case
shows about the potentially huge quantity of a tribe's reserved right,
non-Indians may be more cautious about resolving these matters in
the courts. The tribes, now aware that the Supreme Court came close
to diluting the doctrine substantially, have been open to non-judicial
resolutions as well. Lloyd Burton has studied.many of these efforts in
detail and analyzed their relationship to the law.7 4
Since the 1980s, more than a dozen settlements effecting major
quantifications of Indian water rights have been reached by negotia
tion and typically followed by implementing federal legislation.7 5 Each
settlement is different and attuned to the local situation. Yet the most
common feature of the settlement packages is a federal subsidy for
development of water facilities or purchase of water rights so that non
Indians can continue using water unmolested by the development of
Indian water rights. Generally, the settlements have "enlarged the
pie," so that non-Indians gain in the process. It is fair to say that if a
tribe wants to quantify, use, and enforce its water rights it must find a
way to collaborate with non-Indian neighbors and make them whole,
or even better off.
The most recent chapter in the Winters story mimics the first.
Many reservations languish without water that could nourish their
economic security and improve their lifestyle. Federal assistance to the
tribes has been inadequate. In its 1998 Report, the Western Water
Policy Review Advisory Commission described the continuing failure
to resolve reserved rights claims as creating "an inequitable situation
for Indians and considerable uncertainty among all other water us
ers."76 The commission called for the government "to fulfill its trust re
sponsibilities to Indian nations and tribes to secure and protect tribal
water rights and to assist the nations and tribes in putting those rights
to use."77 The fruition of the tribes' paper legal rights depends, as it
always has, on federal assistance, which is not likely to be forthcoming
unless it will result in tangible benefits to non-Indians.

74. LLOYD BURTON, AMERICAN INDIAN WATER RIGHTS AND THE LIMITS OF LAW
(1991).
75. See DAYID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS
ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
0
844-852 (4th ed. 1998); David H. Getches, The Metamorphosis of Western Water Policy:
Have Federal Laws and Local Policy Eclipsed the States' Role?, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 52
& nn.240-43 (2001).
76. WESTERN WATER POLICY REVIEW ADVISORY COMMISSION, supra note 70, at 2-28.
77. Id. at xix.
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CONCLUSION

John Shurts has advanced our understanding of the reserved rights
doctrine by illuminating the milieu of its formulation and early days.
He adds several new perspectives. By explaining that the prior appro
priation doctrine was not the only brand of water law that could fit the
West's conditions or, indeed, that had been considered, he deflates a
popular western myth. Although other writers have mustered a wealth
of contemporary criticisms of the Winters decision to show how eccen
tric it was, Shurts's research reveals that it was not, in fact, uniformly
disdained in Montana in 1908; the most outraged observers were poli
ticians from outside the state. A final project of Shurts's important
study was to show how Winters was applied in the few decades after
the Supreme Court decision.
Shurts is surely correct that the West's aridity did not make inevi
table the universal adoption of prior appropriation. But that adoption
was nearly complete in Montana, and I continue to be among the un
reconstructed types who believe that by 1908, departures from the
prior appropriation doctrine were truly aberrational in western water
law. Yet I do think Winters logically followed the traditions and
precedents of Indian law. My view of the government's deportment
once the Court armed it with reserved water rights is more cynical
than Shurts's; I am moved less by the fact that it was invoked at all and
more by the way it was used primarily to benefit non-Indians.
Although some of my conclusions from the penetrating research
presented by the book differ from the author's, I nevertheless find it to
be a rich and well-presented source. The research provides an impres
sive and sound basis for drawing one's own conclusions.
Important lessons flow from learning about the local social and
economic context. One is that Winters might not have been advanced
by the federal officials and attorney but for the potential alignment of
Indian and non-Indian self-interest. Another is that once federal litiga
tion on behalf of Indians is unleashed, its unpopularity or potential for
disrupting larger regional or national policies of social and economic
importance may not hold it back. Federal litigators and, most signifi
cantly, the United States Supreme Court have often resisted political
winds to hold the line on depreciation of Indian rights absent clear
congressional instructions otherwise. This phenomenon and the legal
principles invoked by the Court make Winters a coherent part of In
dian law jurisprudence, if a water law aberration.
Another lesson from this new history is that, having won the case,
the government applied it selectively where and when it would pro-
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duce substantial benefits for non-Indians. That history seems to be re
peating itself in the way the doctrine is applied today. This lesson is at
once troubling in its crassness and instructive to Indian law tacticians
who are seeking ways to give value to the tribes' potentially vast water
rights estate.

